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Under-collateralisation and rehypothecation 
in the OTC derivatives markets
At present there is sizable activity in the OTC derivatives market that is under-collateralised. The margin/
collateral requirements at central counterparties (CCPs) should help the OTC derivatives market be better 
collateralised, lowering the derivatives risk at the large banks that dominate this market. However, the 
overall netting beneﬁ  ts may be less if the several CCPs that are in operation are not linked. Also, large 
banks make very effective use of collateral they receive that has rehypothecation rights.1 This implies that 
overall cost to large banks in moving OTC derivatives to CCPs will be sizable.
MANMOHAN SINGH
Senior Economist
Monetary and Capital Markets Department
International Monetary Fund
NB  The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management.
1  “Rehypothecation” has nothing to do with the French word “hypothèque” which means the right given to a lender to repossess the underlying asset in case of 
delinquency.
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Chart 1
Derivative payables (after netting)1
(USD billions)
September 2009
September 2009 with assigned collateral added back2
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1  Assigned collateral is collateral posted against speciﬁ  c OTC derivative 
contracts that may be reused (rehypothecated) for other purposes by the 
institution to which it is posted.
2  Residual derivative payables are the sum of the negative replacement 
values, after netting, associated with the institutions outstanding contracts. 
After-netting takes into account the impact of legally enforceable master 
netting agreements.
Source: IMF Staff and 10-Q ﬁ  lings
T
he recent financial crisis has provided 
an impetus to move the lightly regulated 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts 
to central counterparties (CCPs) rather than the 
bilateral clearing that has taken place to date. The 
debate about the future of ﬁ  nancial regulation has 
heated up as regulators in both the United States and 
European Union seek legislative approval to mitigate 
systemic risk associated with large complex ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (LCFIs). This paper shows that large banks 
active in the OTC derivatives market do not hold 
collateral against all the positions in their trading book 
and provides an estimate of this under-collateralisation. 
Whatever collateral is held by banks is allowed to be 
rehypothecated (i.e. the collateral received can be 
re-used for other purposes). Banks, in general, use 
collateral very efﬁ  ciently. Since CCPs would require all 
positions to have collateral against them, off-loading a 
signiﬁ  cant portion of OTC derivatives transactions to 
central counterparties would require large increases in 
posted collateral. These costs suggest that most large 
banks will be reluctant to ofﬂ  oad their positions to CCPs.
We measure the exposure of the ﬁ  nancial system to the 
failure of a large bank (or non-bank) dominant in the OTC 
derivatives market, according to their total “derivative 
payables” (and not “derivative receivables”).2 Derivative 
payables represent the sum of the counterparty’s contracts 
that are liabilities of the large bank. Similarly, derivative 
receivables represent the sum of the counterparty’s 
contracts that are the assets of the large bank. At present, 
the cost to the ﬁ  nancial system from a large bank’s 
derivative payables does not carry a regulatory capital 
charge and are not reﬂ  ected in risk assessments.3 On 
the other hand, derivative receivables are imbedded in 
credit risk and there is already a capital charge/provision 
for potential non receivables. Regulators usually look 
at the asset side of the balance sheet for ‘risk-weighted 
assets’. By using derivative payables as a yardstick, we 
thus provide an available measure of systemic risk that 
is comparable across all global banks that are active in 
the OTC derivatives market.
Financial information from recent years suggests that 
ﬁ  ve US banks active in this market are carrying about 
USD 500 billion in OTC derivative payables exposure. 
The key institutions active in the OTC derivatives 
in the United States are Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, 
JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley. In 
Europe, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, UBS, Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) and Credit Suisse are sizable players. 
In Europe, the ﬁ  ve largest European banks had about 
USD 600-USD 700 billion in under-collateralised 
risk (measured by residual derivative payables) 
as of December 2008. It is useful to note that the 
International Swap and Derivatives Association’s 
(ISDA) master agreements allow banks and others 
active in this market to net (or offset) their derivative 
receivables and payables exposure on an entity. 
Thus if Goldman Sachs has a positive position with 
Citigroup on a interest rate swap and a negative 
position with Citigroup on a credit derivative, ISDA 
allows for netting of the two positions. Thus, the focus 
of this article is on derivative payables, after netting. 
Collateral is posted in an OTC derivatives context to 
cover for the likelihood of default, operational and 
counterparty risk of the transaction that is being 
collateralised etc. Residual derivative payables 
exposure can be used to show the maximal extent 
of under-collateralisation, which is substantial.
2  In Europe and under the International Financial Reporting Standards, derivative payables are also called negative replacement values, and derivative receivables 
are called positive replacement values.
3  Unlike market risk, credit risk and operational risk that attract capital charges in the Basel II framework, systemic risk has not yet been considered by regulators. 
Also, regulators usually look at the asset side of the balance sheet for ‘risk-weighted assets’; thus derivative payables, a liability, is a counterintuitive measure.
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1| COST TO MOVE OTC 
  DERIVATIVES TO CENTRAL 
  COUNTERPARTIES (CCPS)
According to earlier studies, uncollateralised 
derivative payables total about USD 2.0 trillion (Singh 
and Aitken, 2009; Segoviano and Singh, 2008). This 
largely stems from the present market practice where 
privileged clients of large banks do not post sufﬁ  cient 
margin (e.g., sovereigns, central banks, AAA insurers, 
Fannie Freddie, and corporates etc.); also, banks 
do not post collateral with each other either. This 
ﬁ  gure is much higher than ﬁ  ndings from a recent 
BIS study.4 This difference stems largely from the 
fact that “assigned collateral”, which appears in the 
large banks’ 10-Q5 (or similar) ﬁ  nancial statements, 
is largely rehypothecated (or re-used) by the major 
players in this market for other purposes and is not 
dedicated/segregated for the purpose for which such 
collateral is received. A recent ECB study ﬁ  nds that 
the extent of collateralisation is only 44 percent, 
which could indicate that the ISDA survey may be on 
the high side.6 To the extent such ‘assigned collateral’ 
would now have to be posted at the CCP, this sum 
(often in the range of USD 20 – USD 70 billion per 
large bank) will now be unavailable to be re-used. 
A key argument in favor of moving OTC derivatives 
to CCPs was netting across contracts, and the 
corresponding reduction in counterparty risk. The 
intuition is that the margin required to cover the 
exposure of the portfolio would be smaller under 
a CCP than margining its individual components, 
since the prices of the portfolio’s components would 
be correlated and could be offset in a CCP. Current 
regulatory proposals envision that all standardised 
4  BIS Quarterly, September 2009, paper uses the ISDA survey, and concludes that under-collateralization is about USD 1 trillion for both derivatives and receivables 
(which would imply roughly 0.5 trillion for derivative payables).
5  Form 10-Q shall be used for quarterly reports under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
6  EU Commission’s comment on ISDA: “The dominant source of the nature and extent of bilateral collateral is ISDA’s margin surveys. This section is based on the 
numbers provided by ISDA. However, the Commission services cannot judge the solidity of these numbers, as no information is available about the methodology 
for calculating the numbers. They should accordingly be considered as indicative only.”
7  Many banks presently have sizable unencumbered or cash collateral deposited with their central banks. We assume, given the high ratings the banks active in the 
OTC derivatives market, that the opportunity cost of posting collateral to CCPs will be the same whether LCFIs use their deposits with central banks or opt for new 
funding in capital markets.
8  Initial margin in bilateral contracts for CDS contracts are typically high due to their ‘jump risk’ (or sudden change in the price of the reference entity) and can reach 
10–30 percent of notionals; for interest rate swaps (IRS) it is much lower, around 1 percent of notional or even less.
(or eligible) derivatives should be cleared by CCPs. 
However, CCPs will require collateral to be posted 
from all its members. Thus ofﬂ  oading transactions 
to CCPs would make the under-collateralisation gap 
obvious and require large increases in collateral. The 
amount of capital needed to be raised will depend 
on how the collateral requirements are assessed by 
CCPs and the regulators (e.g., entity type, rating, or 
riskiness of the compressed portfolio that is ofﬂ  oaded 
to CCPs) and how ﬁ  rms choose to raise the required 
collateral.7
Dealers may, therefore, ﬁ  nd it costly to move their 
trades to CCPs and these costs may not be trivial 
for the following three reasons: (i) the inability to 
effectively net internal position across products for 
any given client (ii) the larger upfront cost of posting 
initial margin and guarantee fund contributions at 
CCPs, and (iii) loss from the inability to rehypothecate 
the existing posted collateral which they use (and 
re-use) to ﬁ  nance other parts of their business.8
In this way, regulators could either mandate that 
largest players use CCPs, or make it costly for 
them to keep nonstandard contracts on the books. 
To achieve this, regulators are in favor of imposing 
some type of charge/tax on contracts that may not 
move to CCPs. While such a move may encourage 
standardisation, the overall collateral needs within 
the ﬁ  nancial system may be onerous. The initial 
margin requirement (including monies toward 
the guarantee/default fund) to move to CCPs will 
increase. To attain a critical mass (which we assume 
to be two-thirds) of all standardised OTC derivatives 
to move to CCPs, some illustrative arithmetic based 
on margin requirement trends at the large CCPs 
suggests that about USD 200 billion may be needed 
in initial margins and guarantee funds (see Table 1). 
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2| REHYPOTHECATION (OR RE-USE) 
  OF COLLATERAL 
  BY LARGE BANKS
Any estimate of the costs of moving to CCPs is not 
complete unless there is discussion of how banks 
re-use the collateral pledged with them from various 
clients. Based on recent 10-Q reports, rehypothecation 
declined rapidly post-Lehman. After Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, prime brokers have been demanding 
more cash collateral in place of securities (unless 
they are highly liquid securities). Post-Lehman, some 
investors have taken precautionary measures against 
rehypothecation by opting to hold assets in custody 
accounts. Data show that the decline between end-2007 
through end-2009 for “total collateral received that can 
be repledged/ rehypothecated” by the largest seven 
US broker-dealers—Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and 
JPMorgan—declined from about USD 4.5 trillion to 
USD 2.1 trillion (see Chart 2). 
On-balance sheet data do not “churn”, where churning 
means the extent of re-use of an asset. If an item is 
listed as an asset or liability at one bank, it cannot 
be listed as an asset or liability of another bank by 
deﬁ  nition; this is not true for pledged collateral. Since 
on-balance sheet is the snapshot of a ﬁ  rm’s assets and 
liabilities on a given day, these cannot be the assets 
or liabilities of another ﬁ  rm on that day. However, 
off-balance sheet item(s) like ‘collateral that is 
Chart 2
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Note: JPMorgan data post November 2007 includes Bear Stearns and 
Washington Mutual.
permitted to be re-used’ are shown simultaneously 
in footnotes by several entities. These ﬁ  rms do not 
own the collateral but due to rehypothecation rights 
they are legally allowed to use the collateral in their 
own name.
Since the US banks rehypothecate “collateral 
received that can be pledged” with European banks 
and vice versa, the source of off-balance sheet 
funding is higher (through the velocity of collateral). 
Table 1
Summary of costs to move to CCPs
(USD)
Ratio of (initial margin + 
guarantee fund) to notional 
Ofﬂ  oading 2/3 of present 
notional size of market 
Extrapolated costs 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) 1/600 to 1/3001 2/3 x 36 trillion 40–80 billion
Interest rate swaps (IRSs) 1/5,000 to 1/3,300  Additional 100 trillion2 40–50 billion
Forex, Equity, Commodities 
& Unallocated contracts 1/1,000 2/3 x 130 trillion 90 billion
Total Costs 2/3 x 600 trillion 170–220 billion
Note: In the absence of information on open-positions in the future, we use the present ratio of initial margin and guarantee fund to notional cleared, and estimate costs to LCFIs.
1  From a CCP view, clearing compressed portfolio(s) may shrink the USD 30 trillion notional to USD 3 trillion, but then they would use a ratio of 3/100 
(or 3% for initial margin + guarantee fund/compressed notional cleared).
2  We acknowledge that about USD 200 trillion market in plain vanilla IRS is already being cleared. If the remaining USD 100 trillion of the more complex IRS clears, 
this would result in about 2/3 of the USD 437 trillion market in IRS moving to CCPs.
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9  Typically, hedge funds specialising in ﬁ  xed-income and convertible arbitrage seek leverage and in lieu of the associated borrowing, post collateral with the large 
banks. Market sources indicate that on average, each of the largest 20-25 hedge funds borrowed USD 30-60 billion from their prime brokers (or roughly USD 1 trillion); 
collateral was posted by the hedge funds in line with their borrowing around end-2007. After Lehman’s crisis, and given the regulatory efforts to reduce leverage, 
re-use of pledged collateral has now come down sizably.
10  In other words, 30 percent—40 percent x USD 10 trillion total pledged collateral divided by USD 1 trillion collateral that is allowed to be rehypothecated by the hedge 
fund industry. Note that our sample does not account for other large banks that may also be active in areas associated with pledged collateral (HSBC, Société générale, 
BNP Paribas, HSBC, Nomura etc.) and thus the churning factor may be higher since this would increase the numerator of this fraction.
11  Interoperability (or linking of CCPs), which allows a market participant (e.g., LCFI) to concentrate its portfolio at a CCP of its choice, regardless of what CCP its 
trading counterparty chooses to use. Thus, at the level of each CCP, CCPi may have access to collateral from another CCPj that may go bankrupt in the future, so 
that losses involved in closing out CCPj’s obligations to CCPi can be covered.
When we include other large banks with signiﬁ  cant 
relations with the hedge fund industry such as 
Deutsche Bank, UBS, Barclays, RBS and Credit Suisse, 
the total available pledged collateral was over 
USD 10 trillion at end-2007 (see Annex 1)
The total assets under management (AUM) of the 
global hedge fund industry were about USD 2 trillion 
as of end-2007 (prior to the crisis). Assuming an 
average leverage of 2, the hedge fund industry held 
roughly USD 4 trillion of securities on a mark-to-market 
basis. Based on discussions with collateral teams at 
large banks (since hedge funds do not provide this 
information), about USD 1 trillion of the market 
value of securities of the hedge fund industry was 
rehypothecated, as of end-2007.9
Since hedge funds have typically contributed about 
30 percent–40 percent of all pledgeable collateral 
received by the large banks, the churning of hedge 
fund collateral could have been between 3 and 4.10 
Thus in the context of this article, if large banks were 
to post USD 200 billion with central counterparties in 
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the context of ofﬂ  oading OTC derivative positions to 
them, the real cost may be USD 200 billion times the 
relation to the churning factor (forthcoming Singh, 
2010). 
3| POLICY ISSUES FOR REGULATORS 
  TO CONSIDER
The paper has noted that at present there is 
sizable activity in the OTC derivatives market 
that is under-collateralised. The margin/collateral 
requirements at central counterparties should help 
the OTC derivatives market be better collateralised, 
lowering the derivative payables at the large banks 
that dominate this market. However, the overall 
netting beneﬁ  ts may be less if the several CCPs 
that are in operation are not linked (i.e., there is 
no interoperability).11 The margin requirements 
from multiple un-linked CCPs will be much higher 
than if only one existed or if they were linked. 
This implies that the full beneﬁ  ts of CCPs would 
not be forthcoming. 
￿ Regulators should be cognisant that LCFIs active in 
OTC derivatives market under collateralise relative to 
the risk they assume (there is an estimated shortfall 
of up to USD 2 trillion if measured by the derivative 
payables carried by the major market participants).
￿ Whatever collateral already posted is currently 
allowed to be rehypothecated (so collateral needs 
will be even more onerous if placed at CCPs). Thus, 
ofﬂ  oading transactions to CCPs would make this gap 
obvious and require large increases in collateral. 
￿ Large banks make very effective use of pledged 
collateral they receive that has rehypothecation 
rights; the churning factor of collateral gives an idea 
to the real cost of posting collateral. 
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ANNEX
Current rules on rehypothecation in the United States and the United Kingdom
A deﬁ  ned set of customer protection rules for rehypothecated assets exists in the United States, but not 
in the United Kingdom. This difference meant that when Lehman Brothers International Europe (LBIE, 
United Kingdom) ﬁ  led for insolvency there was little statutory protection available to those customers who 
allowed re-use of their collateral. In the United States, however, the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) 
of 1970 provides for certain procedures that will apply in the event of the insolvency of a broker-dealer. 
In the United Kingdom, an unlimited amount of the customer’s assets can be rehypothecated and there 
are no customer protection rules. By contrast, in the United States, Rule 15c3–3 limits a broker-dealer from 
using its customer’s securities to ﬁ  nance its proprietary activities. Under Reg T, the broker-dealer may use/
rehypothecate an amount up to 140 percent of the customer’s debit balance.1 Created by SIPA, the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is an important part of the overall system of investor protection in the 
United States.2 SIPC’s focus is very speciﬁ  c: restoring funds to investors with assets in the hands of bankrupt 
and otherwise ﬁ  nancially troubled brokerage ﬁ  rms (e.g., Lehman). Since 1970, SIPC has grossed more than 
USD 2 billion from its members’ assessments that can be used by investors to recover assets in the event of 
a brokerage ﬁ  rm’s insolvency.
A key reason why hedge funds have previously opted for funding in Europe (especially the United Kingdom) is that 
leverage is not capped as in the United States via the 140 percent rule under Rule 15c3–3. Leverage levels at many 
UK hedge funds, banks and ﬁ  nancial afﬁ  liates have been higher, as the United Kingdom does not have a similar 
cap. Thus, prime brokers and banks would rehypothecate their client’s assets along with their own proprietary 
assets as collateral for funding from the global ﬁ  nancial system. Lehman’s administrators PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) conﬁ  rmed in October 2008 that certain assets provided to LBIE were rehypothecated and no longer 
held for the client on a segregated basis and as a result the client may no longer have a proprietary interest 
in the assets. As such, LBIE investors (e.g., hedge funds) fell within the general body of unsecured creditors. 
Consequently, hedge fund assets with LBIE have remained frozen in the United Kingdom, whereas thanks to 
SIPA, this was not the case in the United States. Disentangling hedge fund assets from the broker-dealer/banks’ 
proprietary assets that have been rehypothecated together, has been an onerous task in the United Kingdom..
Rehypothecation in Continental Europe
Our understanding from legal sources is that the EU law does not establish a quantitative cap on the rehypothecation 
of collateral pledged to broker-dealers akin to that found in the US’s SEC Rule 15c3–3. EU law permits the parties 
to strike their own bargain as to how much (if any) collateral may be subject to rights of reuse. The regulatory 
regime for broker-dealers and their customers may lead to some re-thinking due to the litigation involving 
Dexia in 2009. However, changes are still distant from being ﬁ  nalised and it is impossible to say at this stage 
what changes (if any) can be expected as regards limiting rehypothecation rights.
1  Assume a customer has USD 500 in pledged securities and a debit balance of USD 200, resulting in net equity of USD 300. The broker-dealer can rehypothecate 
up to USD 280 of the customer’s assets (140 percent x USD 200).
2  Derivatives, repos and futures are not covered by SIPA, so any collateral associated with those products may not be covered (so there is uncapped rehypothecation 
in the United States, if collateral is associated with these products). To clarify, SIPA’s regime does not relate to collateral; rather it relates generally speaking to the 
return of a customer’s equity as calculated through something called the net equity claim.
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